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CALL FOR CONSISTENCY: TITLE VII AND SAME-
SEX HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL
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The Fifth Circuit has definitively held that same-sex hostile
environment harassment is not actionable under Title VII. Another circuit
court, however, has held that a cause of action exists under Title VII for
same-sex hostile environment harassment in certain, limited
circumstances.' Yet other circuits have held that same-sex sexual
harassment is actionable under the statute.2 Because of this conflict
between circuits, the Supreme Court has just this summer agreed to rule on
the issue.' Same-sex hostile environment harassment clearly should be
held actionable under Title VII. 4 This comment seeks to address factors
that have contributed to and which cast light upon this anomalous result.
Such factors include both the internal inconsistencies in the hostile
environment harassment law as it is applied in various contexts, as well as
external inconsistencies in hostile environment harassment law as
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1. See Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 141 (4th Cir. 1996)
("[A] claim under Title VII for same-sex 'hostile work environment' harassment may lie
where the perpetrator of the sexual harassment is homosexual."); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas
& Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 753 (4th Cir. 1996) ("In sum, while harassment directed toward
an individual employee by another individual of the same gender may be actionable if it is
directed at the employee 'because of the employee's gender, the plaintiff must overcome
the presumption in that circumstance that the harassment was not 'because of that
employee's gender.").
2. See Fredette v. BVP Management Associates, 112 F.3d 1503 (1lth Cir. 1997); Doe
v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 574 (7th Cir. 1997); Yeary v. Goodwill Industries-
Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 448 (6th Cir. 1997); Quick v. Donaldson Co. Inc., 90 F.3d
1372, 1379 (8th Cir. 1996).
3. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996), cert.
granted, 117 S. Ct. 2430 (1997).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988) ("[It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer] to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin .... ).
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compared to racial and religious harassment law. Furthermore, an attempt
will be made to evaluate the sources of these internal and external
inconsistencies, and an alternative approach to hostile environment claims
will be suggested which will eradicate such inconsistencies.
I. HISTORY OF HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT HARASSMENT
Title VII provides that it is unlawful for an employer "to discriminate
against any individual.., because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin."5 Sex discrimination was included within
the protection of Title VII immediately before the law was passed and
there is, therefore, a dearth of legislative history regarding the intent of
Congress in including the provision. However, it is clear from the limited
available history that the primary concerns voiced by those proposing the
amendment involved obtaining equal treatment for women. It is also
evident that the proposed addition of the word "sex" resulted in great
opposition to Title VII as a whole with numerous members of the House
agreeing to vote for passage of the bill only if the term "sex" was stricken
from the act.7
There exist two recognized forms of sexual harassment which are
actionable under Title VII, "quid pro quo" sexual harassment and "hostile
environment" sexual harassment!8 Quid pro quo sexual harassment
involves the employer's conditioning the receipt of a benefit on sexual
conduct by the employee. Hostile environment harassment does not
involve such direct pressure to engage in sexual conduct, but rather
involves exposure to workplace conduct which is pervasively offensive
and psychologically intimidating such that it affects the employees'
"conditions of employment" and, therefore, is in violation of Title VII.9
Hostile environment sexual harassment has its origins in the racial
discrimination context. An environment, so polluted by racial animosity
that it infringes on an employee's psychological well-being, has been held
to violate Title VII to the same extent as discrimination by an employer
who intentionally imposes racially disparate treatment on employees. 0
Hostile environment harassment has also been found to lay the basis for a
Title VII violation where the harassment is directed at the employee's
5. Id.
6. See 110 CONG. REc. H2577-84 (1964).
7. See id.
8. See Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title
VII, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1454 (1984).
9. See id. at 1455.
10. See, e.g., Gray v. Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234,238 (5th Cir. 1971).
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national origin" or religion.
1 2
A. Supreme Court Origins of Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment
It is from these sources, in the areas of racial, religious, and national
origin harassment, that hostile environment sexual harassment developed
as an affront actionable under Title VII. The Supreme Court first
recognized hostile environment sexual harassment in Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson.3 The Court emphasized that Title VII was broadly written
and intended to reach the full range of incongruous treatment of men and
women and, therefore, was not limited to employer conduct which
impinged on tangible attributes of employment such as compensation.'4
Further, the Court emphasized that it could discern no reason to allow
hostile environment to be actionable in the context of harassment based on
race, religion, or national origin, but to foreclose the legal remedy
provided by Title VII in the context of sexual, hostile environment
harassment.' The Court then articulated the requirements for a hostile
environment sexual harassment claim under Title VII. The conduct
alleged must be unwelcome and sufficiently severe to alter the employee's
conditions of employment. The Court also reiterated that mere utterance
of an offensive word would not be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
a Title VII violation. Furthermore, the Court held that existence of a
hostile work environment should be determined from a "totality of the
circumstances."' 6
The Court further refined the requirements of a hostile environment
sexual harassment action in Harris v. Forklift Systems.17 In Harris, the
Court rejected the requirement that a hostile work environment must
actually result in psychological damage to the employee to be actionable
under Title VIIV8 The Court stated that an actionable hostile environment
claim would require a work environment that was more abusive than one
that contained the occasional "merely offensive" comment, but did not
11. See Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir.
1977) ("[D]erogatory comments [can] be so excessive and opprobrious as to constitute an
unlawful employment practice under Title VII.").
12. See Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 160-61 (S.D. Ohio 1976) ("When
a person vested with managerial responsibilities embarks upon a course of conduct
calculated to demean an employee before his fellows because of the employee's professed
religious views, such activity will necessarily have the effect of altering the conditions of
his employment.").
13. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
14. See id. at 64.
15. See id. at 65.
16. See id. at 67-68.
17. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
18. See id. at 22.
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require tangible psychological injury. 9 Instead, the inquiry was whether a
"reasonable person" would perceive the work environment as objectively
abusive because of the sexually harassing conduct.2° The Court went on to
suggest that the hostile environment inquiry was not a bright line test and,
instead, involved a consideration of several factors including, but not
limited to, the frequency and severity of the offensive conduct and the
effect of such conduct on the employee.2'
B. Lower Court Refinements of the Harris & Meritor Standards
Some courts since Harris have suggested that the "reasonable person"
perspective on harassing behavior should be further refined to evaluate the
behavior from the perspective of the reasonable victim.22 In the case of
male on female harassment' this would require an interpretation of the
behavior from the perspective of the reasonable woman.24 This standard
has not, however, been universally adopted, and most courts continue to
employ a gender neutral reasonable person standard. 
2
In addition to the inclusion of a gender specific reasonable person,
other lower courts have required the additional finding that the harassment
would not have been engaged in "but for" the victim's sex.2 This "but
for" requirement flows from the Title VII requirement that the harassment
or discrimination be "because of' the employee's sex. One court, for
example, has indicated that hostile environment harassment in violation of
Title VII would be found where objectionable demands are made of a
female employee that would not also have been made of a male
19. See id. at21.
20. See id. at 22.
21. See id. at 23.
22. See, e.g., Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 962 n.3 (8th Cir.
1992) (noting the EEOC supports the evaluation of Title VII claims from the perspective of
the victim); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[I]n evaluating the
severity and pervasiveness of sexual harassment, we should focus on the perspective of the
victim.").
23. "Male on female harassment" will be used throughout this comment to connote
harassment perpetrated by a male harasser on a female victim.
24. See, e.g., Burns, 989 F.2d at 962 n.3 ("[I]n hostile environment litigation under
Title VII, the appropriate standard is that of a reasonable woman under similar
circumstances."); Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878 ("A complete understanding of the victim's view
requires ... an analysis of the different perspectives of men and women.").
25. See Saba Ashraf, Note, The Reasonableness of the "Reasonable Woman"
Standard: An Evaluation of Its Use in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Claims
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 21 HoFsTRA L. REv. 483, 487 (1992).
26. See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-04 (1lth Cir. 1982);
Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Polly v. Houston Lighting & Power
Co., 825 F.Supp. 135, 138 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
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employee. 7 This finding, taken to its logical conclusion, results in the
holding of some courts that behavior which is objectionable to, and
directed at, both men and women cannot form the basis for a Title VII
action because both men and women are being treated with equivalent
hostility z  Courts have suggested that in instances where offensive
conduct is directed at both genders, an individual may still have a state law
action in tort to address the objectionable conduct.
2
Currently, the only standard set forward by the Supreme Court in the
area of hostile environment harassment is that articulated by Meritor and
Harris. Under that standard, the requirements that must be met for a
hostile environment harassment claim are that the behavior be unwelcome,
severe, and pervasive enough that a reasonable person would view the
behavior as altering the conditions of employment. Additionally, in
certain courts the "reasonable victim" standard is employed and the "but
for" the employee's sex test must also be met.
II. SAME-SEX HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT HARASSMENT
Currently, circuit and district courts are split on whether a claim for
same-sex sexual harassment should be actionable under Title VII. The
reasoning of those courts that have held that such harassment is not
actionable differs somewhat, although the ultimate result is identical,
leaving the employee no Title VII remedy for the harassing behavior. The
inconsistent reasoning of courts that have held that same-sex harassment is
not actionable makes it difficult to predict what the ultimate resolution will
be when the Supreme Court decides the issue in Oncale. Furthermore, the
reasoning of these courts generally is not based on the standards set forth
by the Court in Meritor and Harris. Rather, the courts have interpreted the
additional requirements for a hostile environment claim under Title VII
that have been added by lower courts, such as the "but for" test. The
inconsistent treatment of same-sex harassment claims by lower courts has
resulted in increased confusion in sexual harassment law-an area of law
which, though speciously settled by the Supreme Court in Meritor, has left
lower courts struggling to resolve the more complex variations of these
issues in a world that is increasingly socially and sexually complicated.
A. Circuits That Have Held Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Not
27. See Bundy, 641 F.2d at 942 ("The supervisor... made demands of [the employee]
that he would not have made of male employees.").
28. See Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620.
29. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 904 (noting, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Meitor, that "[in such cases, the sexual harassment would not be based upon sex because
men and women are accorded like treatment.").
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Actionable Under Title VII
One circuit to rule definitively on the issue of same-sex hostile
environment harassment is the Fifth Circuit, which held that same-sex
hostile environment harassment is not actionable under Title VII. 30 The
court in Garcia found that same-sex sexual harassment was not actionable
through reliance on an unpublished appellate decision and a district court
case in which the court found that heterosexual same-sex harassment, even
that which contains sexual overtones, is not actionable under Title VITL 3
The Fifth Circuit did not discuss the issue in further detail and stated only
that such activity does not fall within the protection of Title VII.
32
The district court in Goluszek did not reason that same-sex hostile
environment discrimination was not actionable because of the plaintiff-
employee's failure to satisfy the "but for" test.13 Instead, the court focused
on the fact that, as a whole, the environment in which the plaintiff was
employed was not anti-male, and therefore, any harassment which had
occurred was not actionable.' However, an anti-male or anti-female
environment is not a requirement for an actionable sexual harassment
claim under Title VII as articulated by the Supreme Court in Meritor and
in Harris. Even so, the court did in fact find sufficient evidence that the
plaintiff would have been treated differently by his supervisors if he had
been a woman.35 Hence, the "but for" test was satisfied because "but for"
the employee being male, he would have received different treatment.
Therefore, although the plaintiff satisfied one of the additional
requirements for a hostile environment claim under Title VII, the Fifth
Circuit denied his action on alternative grounds.
The Goluszek court focused on the intent of Congress in enacting
Title VII, which was, according to the court, to eradicate
"discrimination... stemming from an imbalance of power and an abuse of
that imbalance by the powerful, which results in discrimination against a
30. See Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994). The court held
that same-sex harassment was not actionable where Garcia alleged that he had been sexually
harassed by his male supervisor. See id. at 452. The alleged conduct of the supervisor
included sexual gesturing toward and touching of Garcia. See id. at 448.
31. See id. at 451-52 (citing Giddens v. Shell Oil Co., No. 92-08533 (5th Cir. Dec. 6,
1993), and Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. IIl. 1988)).
32. See id. at 452.
33. See Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988). Goluszek was a
heterosexual male who was harassed by his heterosexual co-workers. The harassment
focused on the plaintiff's inferred lack of sexual experience and his accused ineffectual
masculinity. See id. at 1454. The harassment included sexual comments regarding the
plaintiff's past sexual experiences and suggestions by co-workers of future sexual activity,
as well as physical threats of a sexual and non-sexual nature. See id.
34. See id. at 1456.
35. See id.
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discrete and vulnerable group."36 The court found that even though the
plaintiff may have been harassed because he was a male, he was not
subjected to the harassment in an environment which was anti-male, and
therefore, the harassment was not actionable under Title VIIY The court
indicated further that several forms of harassment of employees exist,
including those which have sexual overtones, which are not actionable
under Title VII because the behaviors are not of the type intended to be
prohibited by Congress in enacting the statute.38 The court did, however,
acknowledge that a "wooden" application of the language of Title VII
would appear to provide for a cause of action.39 Nonetheless, the court
declined to apply such a formulation of the language of the statute, finding
instead that allowing for a cause of action for same-sex sexual harassment
under the language of Title VII would conflict with the intent of Congress
in enacting the statute.' Therefore, Goluszek failed to state a claim under
Title VII because, even though he was harassed because he was a male, his
harassment could not be "harassment by the powerful of the powerless,"
because he was not employed in an environment where, in general, men
were a less powerful group.
Many other courts that have also found same-sex sexual harassment
not actionable under Title VII have done so through reliance on Garcia's
reasoning, which in turn relied on the reasoning of Goluszek.4' Some
36. Id.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 1456 ("Title VII does not make all forms of harassment actionable, nor
does it even make all forms of verbal harassment with sexual overtones actionable.").
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See Benekritis v. Johnson, 882 F. Supp. 521 (D.S.C. 1995). Plaintiff-employee was
harassed on two occasions by his male mentor. See id. at 523-24. The harassment included
physical conduct of a sexual nature between the employee and a more experienced fellow
employee. See id. The court reviewed the findings of courts which held same-sex
harassment actionable and those which held it not actionable and elected to follow the
reasoning of the courts in Garcia and Goluszek. See id. at 526.
See also Ashworth v. Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp. 489 (W.D. Wash. 1995). Plaintiff-
employee in Ashworth was harassed by a supervisor through physical and verbal conduct of
a sexual nature. See id. at 490. The court rejected the line of cases which hold that same-
sex harassment is actionable under Title VII and instead elected to follow the reasoning of
Garcia and Goluszek. See id. at 494. The court found that the case was factually analogous
to Goluszek and that, as was the case in Goluszek, the plaintiff in Ashworth had failed to
establish that the employment environment was anti-male. See id. Therefore, although the
supervisor-defendant's behavior may have constituted sexual harassment, it was not
actionable under Title VII. See id.
But see Oncale, 83 F.3d 118. The Fifth Circuit indicated in Oncale that they might
now, although bound to follow precedent, doubt the validity of the decision in Garcia. See
id. at 119. After indicating that under the reading of Title VII found in Meritor, the sex of
the harasser and the employee would not appear to be relevant to a determination of
whether conduct was actionable under Title VII, the court stated it could not adopt such a
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courts, however, in holding that same-sex sexual harassment is not
actionable, have focused instead on the need for an element of desire for
sexual gratification in order for hostile environment sexual harassment to
be actionable under Title VII. 2 This requirement effectively precludes
same-sex heterosexual harassment from coverage by the statute while
allowing same-sex homosexual harassment to be actionable under Title
VII. However, grounding a viable cause of action for hostile environment
harassment in the existence of sexual attraction is problematic, not only
because issues of proof will be difficult, but also because this analytic
perspective ignores the well-established explanation for the phenomenon
of sexual harassment. Generally, sexual harassment evolves from an abuse
of power, rather than a desire for sexual gratification. 43  Finally, other
courts have found same-sex sexual harassment not actionable because, at
reading and was instead obligated to follow the precedent of Garcia, which relied on the
reasoning of Goluszek. See id. "Although our analysis in Garcia has been rejected by
various district courts, we cannot overrule a prior panel's decision. In this Circuit, one
panel may not overrule the decision, right or wrong, of a prior panel in the absence of an
intervening contrary or superseding decision by the Court en banc or the Supreme Court."
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
42. See, e.g., Martin v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 926 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Ala. 1996). In
Martin, the plaintiff was subjected to verbal and physical harassment of a sexual nature by
his male, heterosexual co-workers. See id. at 1046-47. The court held that, in the case of
heterosexual same-sex hostile environment harassment, Title VII does not provide for a
cause of action. See id. at 1050. The court first articulated the presumption that harassment
exists in the heterosexual male-female context, in the bisexual context with either sex, or in
the homosexual context with an individual of the same sex when the individual would not
treat individuals of the opposite sex in the same manner. This presumption, according to
the court, results from the perceived need for sexual gratification implicit in these types of
harassment. See id. at 1049. By contrast, in the case of same-sex heterosexual harassment
no such presumption exists because there is no desire for sexual gratification and, thus, no
discrimination. Therefore, such cases are not actionable under Titie VII. See id. For at
least one court, then, "because of sex" in Title VII turns on sexual gratification rather than
solely disparate treatment.
See also Childress v. City of Richmond, 907 F. Supp. 934 (E.D. Va. 1995). Childress
involved a claim by male police officers for hostile environment sexual harassment for
comments directed at female officers. The court looked to case law regarding same-sex
hostile environment harassment as persuasive authority although the case presented the
novel issue of the ability of individuals to assert a hostile environment claim when the
harassment was directed at co-workers of the opposite sex. See id. at 939. After noting that
the prevailing view of the case law is that same-sex sexual harassment is not actionable the
court went on to note that "[o]ne pattern, at least, is clear: for same-sex harassment to
support a claim, there must be an allegation of quid pro quo or, at the very least, some
sexual element to the harassment or hostile environment." Id.
43. See, e.g., Judith I. Avner, Sexual Harassment: Building a Consensus for Change, 3
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 57, 61 (1994) ("[S]exual harassment.., is a learned behavior ....
[This learned behavior is condoned in our society and is a by-product of... inequality
which exists among men, women, and other groups .... [T]his hierarchy of inequality is
based on some groups having power over others and it is sanctioned by differential
treatment and ultimately force.").
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least in the context of heterosexual same-sex harassment, the harassment is
not "because of' the victim's sex as required by the language of Title VII.'
The major areas, then, where courts have found authority for failing
to allow for a cause of action for same-sex hostile environment harassment
under Title VII are in the intent of Congress and in the plain language of
Title VII. First, the intent of Congress is not considered to include
remedying harassment in the workplace unless the environment is one that
evidences hostility toward the victim's gender as a whole. Second, courts
hold that the plain requirement of Title VII's language that the harassment
be "because of' the victim's sex, limits the remedy to only certain claims
that involve either a harasser of the opposite sex or a harasser or victim
who is homosexual. This perspective argues that it would be imprudent to
read the language of the statute more broadly as this would result in
excessive Title VII litigation.
Finally, as with the prudence argument for limiting the availability of
Title VII remedies, courts have found that the "because of sex" language
of the statute implies that a sexual gratification component is necessary to
satisfy the causation requirement in the statute. These divergent
justifications for barring a cause of action for same-sex heterosexual
harassment are linked by the common theme that, whether or not there
should be a legal remedy, Title VII either in language or design does not
protect these employees.
B. Circuits that Have Held Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Actionable
Under Title VII
While some courts have been reluctant to do so, other courts, for
reasons just as disparate, have held that same-sex hostile environment
harassment is actionable under Title VII. The Fourth Circuit is one circuit
to indicate that the statute may, in certain cicumstances, provide for a
44. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 72 (1996). In McWilliams, the plaintiff was subjected to both
physical and verbal harassment of a sexual nature by his male co-workers, all of whom were
allegedly heterosexual. The court first indicated that its finding was limited to heterosexual
same-sex hostile environment harassment claims and was not intended to preclude actions
based on discrimination in employment decisions such as hiring or firing or to preclude
hostile environment claims where the individuals are of the same-sex but either the victim
or the oppressor are homosexual. See id. at 1195 n.4. The court then provided, focusing on
the plain language of Title VII, that "we do not believe that in common understanding the
kind of shameful heterosexual- male-on-heterosexual-male conduct alleged here.., is
considered to be 'because of the [target's] "sex .... Id. at 1195-96. This finding was
necessary, according to the court, to avoid extending the protections of Title VII to an
"unmanageably broad" category of behaviors, which could not, according to the court, have
been intended by Congress when it included the limiting causation language in the statute.
See id. at 1196.
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cause of action for the victims of same-sex hostile environment harassment
under Title VII.45 However, it is clear that, at least in the Fourth Circuit,
the victim of same-sex hostile environment sexual harassment will face a
more difficult time establishing a claim under Title VII than will the
individual who is the victim of harassment by those of the opposite sex.6
Some courts have held that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable,
rejecting the requirement, articulated in Goluszek, that the environment
needs to be hostile to all members of the victim's sex.47 In Doe, the
Seventh Circuit "reject[ed] the narrow construction of Title VII advanced
by Goluszek, Garcia, and their progeny. Unless we read into the statute
limitations that have no foundation in the broad, gender-neutral language
that Congress employed, it is evident that anyone sexually harassed can
pursue a claim under Title VII, no matter what her gender or that of her
harasser.' '48 Likewise, in Fredette, the Eleventh Circuit found it could
"readily conclude that the Goluszek rationale is flawed. The law is well
established that Title VII protectes men as well as women, without regard
to whether the workplace is male-dominated."4'9 Therefore, the court held
same-sex hostile environment harassment actionable through reliance on
the plain language of the statute and by noting the absence of anything to
indicate Congressional intent to the contrary in the legislative history of
45. See Hopkins, 77 F.3d 745. Hopkins was decided two months after the Fourth
Circuit's holding in McWilliams, which stated that Title VII did not provide for a cause of
action for same-sex heterosexual harassment. The Hopkins court, by contrast, found no
such exclusionary language in the wording of Title VII. See id. at 751. Therefore, "sexual
harassment of a male employee, whether by another male or by a female, may be actionable
under Title VII if the basis for the harassment is because the employee is a man." Id. at
752. Subsequently, the Fourth Circuit abated any ambiguity regarding its approach to
same-sex hostile environment harassment in Wrightson, holding that there would be a cause
of action for same-sex sexual harassment only when the perpetrator is homosexual. See
Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 141.
46. See Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 752. Therefore, although rejecting the de facto rule that
same-sex hostile environment harassment is not actionable, the court nonetheless indicated
that the employee would face a substantially more difficult burden of proof when the
harasser and the employee are of the same sex. See id. In effect, the victim in this instance
will have to overcome the presumption that the conduct is not "because of' the individual's
sex but rather, according to the court, is motivated by some other reason. The court went
on to hold that "while harassment directed toward an individual employee by another
individual of the same gender may be actionable if it is directed at the employee 'because
of the employee's gender, the plaintiff must overcome the presumption in that
circumstance that the harassment was not 'because of that employee's gender." Id. at 753.
Further, after Wrightson, it would seem that such a presumption can only be rebutted where
the harasser is a homosexual.
47. See Doe, 119 F.3d 563; Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1509; Johnson v. Community
Nursing Servs., 932 F. Supp. 269 (D. Utah 1996) (holding that Title VII does not exclude
same-sex sexual harassment from protection).
48. Doe, 119 F.3d at 574.
49. Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1509 (footnotes omitted).
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Title VII.
In Johnson, the plaintiff was subjected to verbal sexual harassment by
her homosexual, female supervisor. The court expressly rejected the
Goluszek requirement that the environment in which the victim is harassed
must be hostile to all members of the victim's gender." "This
interpretation would impose an additional requirement to a Title VII cause
of action.... Title VII 'does not require that the work environment be
hostile to all workers of the plaintiff's sex; it requires that the work
environment be hostile to the plaintiff.'' The court went further,
focusing on the plain language of Title VII, to state that there was no
evidence in the language of the statute that would exclude a cause of action
when the harasser and the victim are of the same sex. "Rather, the
language of Title VII creates a 'broad rule of workplace equality.'
5 2
The court in Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods3 indicated that the source of
most jurisprudence holding same-sex sexual harassment not actionable
essentially relied on Goluszek, which is itself founded almost exclusively
on the reasoning of a single law journal commentary that did not even
reach the question of same-sex sexual harassment or the question of
legislative intent in enacting Title VIL 4 Therefore, the decision of the
court in Goluszek holding that the purpose of Title VII was to correct an
imbalance of power and that the statute's protections should only extend to
those individuals who are employed in an environment which is hostile to
their gender as a whole, is not supported by anything other than the
opinion of a single author. "[T]hese 'underlying concerns' are not
Congress's but the viewpoint of a law student... [and] the Note was
written two years before Meritor, the Supreme Court's first and foremost
interpretation of hostile environment sexual harassment claims under Title
VII"5 5 Other courts have, instead, rejected the aspect of the Goluszek
reasoning that articulated the purpose of the statute as a means to redress
an imbalance of power.56 In King the plaintiff was subjected to sexual
harassment by her female, homosexual supervisor. The court explicitly
rejected the finding of Goluszek that the sole purpose of Title VII was to
equalize the imbalance of power between men and women in the
50. See Johnson, 932 F. Supp. at 272.
51. Id. at 272-73.
52. Id. at 273.
53. Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 5458, 1995 WL 640502 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 1, 1995).
54. See id. at *4 (indicating that reliance on a law journal Note was, inter alia, a "leap"
to denying same-sex harassment claims).
55. Id.
56. See King v. M.R. Brown, Inc., 911 F. Supp. 161 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (holding same-sex
sexual harassment actionable under Title VII).
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workplace. ' Further, according to the court, there is no evidence, either in
the statutory language of Title VII or in the legislative history of the
statute, to indicate that Congress intended to extend its protections only to
situations where an individual is harassed by a member of the opposite
sex." The rejection of this theoretical position is based on the prior
extension of Title VII to male victims of sexual harassment. Allowing
Title VII to provide for a cause of action for male victims of sexual
harassment belies the purpose of the statute being merely to redress the
imbalance of power between men and women in the workplace. 9
Furthermore, there is no evidence of such a limiting intent on the part of
Congress either in the language or legislative history of Title VII.
Yet other courts have held homosexual same-sex harassment
actionable under the reasoning that the Meritor Court expressly spoke in
gender neutral terms, which did not limit the application of hostile
environment harassment to heterosexual male on female harassment.
6
0
First, the court in Sardinia found that there is nothing in the language of
Title VII to prevent allowing a cause of action for same-sex sexual
harassment. Further, "Goluszek ignores Supreme Court precedent...
57. See idL at 167 ("This Court respectfully declines to follow the reasoning of
Goluszek... that the only sex discrimination Title VII endeavors to prevent is that
'stemming from an imbalance of power .... '").
58. See id. ("[N]othing in the text of the statute indicates that Title VII's protections
extend only to individuals who are harassed by members of the opposite sex... [and] no
legislative history exists on this issue .... ).
59. See, e.g., Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident Ins., 878 F. Supp. 1545 (M.D.
Ala. 1995). Prescott involved the question of whether an employee subjected to quid pro
quo harassment stated a cause of action when the harasser was of the same sex, which the
court answered in the affirmative. However, the court also discussed whether same-sex
hostile environment harassment would be actionable and likewise answered that question in
the affirmative. See id. at 1549. The court explicitly rejected the Goluszek holding that the
environment need be hostile to all members of the individual's sex, stating that "while this
argument may be logically appealing, it is not the current state of anti-discrimination
jurisprudence. If it were, a similar argument could be made when a white plaintiff attempts
to sue for reverse discrimination under Title VII." Id. at 1550.
60. See Sardinia, 1995 WL 640502 at *5; see also Quick, 90 F.3d at 1378; EEOC v.
Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1102 (M.D. Tenn. 1995) ("Although Vinson
involved the sexual harassment of a female subordinate by a heterosexual male supervisor,
the language used by the Court in defining sexual harassment as discrimination based on
sex was not limited to opposite sex situations."); Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F.
Supp 283, 287 (D.D.C. 1995) ("[I]t cannot be denied that even if the Civil Rights Act of
1964 is silent as to its intended scope, the law's breadth has since increased by judicial
interpretation."); Roe v. K-Mart Corp., Civ.A.No. 94-0068 (GK/PJA), 1995 WL 316783, at
*1 (D.S.C. Mar. 28, 1995). ("The Supreme Court did not restrict its holding to sexual
advances from members of the opposite sex as the victim."). In Quick the court announced
the appropriate test as that outlined in Harris. However, it should be noted that the
defendants in Quick failed to raise directly the issue of the permissability of a cause of
action for same-sex harassment under the statute. See Quick, 90 F.3d at 1372. Therefore,
the Eighth Circuit has not squarely confronted the issue. See Doe, 119 F.3d at 574 n.8.
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'without question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate
because of the subordinate's sex, the supervisor "discriminates" on the
basis of sex.' 6. Second, the court then indicates that the Goluszek court
recognized that the unsuccessful plaintiff in that case may have been
harassed because of his sex, but that the Fifth Circuit, according to the
court, then erroneously concluded that the harassment was not actionable
because it did not take place in an anti-male environment. Third, the court
in Sardinia also found it untenable to allow reverse discrimination cases to
proceed, but not to allow same-sex harassment cases to be actionable
under Title VI.62  Fourth, disallowing same-sex harassment claims
contradicts EEOC guidelines which were relied on by the Supreme Court
in Meritor.63 Finally, the Sardinia court indicated that under a totality of
the circumstances analysis, "suffering sexual harassment from supervisors
of the same sex does nothing to diminish the severity of that
harassment .... 6'
In addition, other courts have held same-sex hostile environment
harassment to be covered by Title VII, particularly in the case of
homosexual harassers, because the "but for" test is satisfied and the
harassment is, therefore, actionable. 5 In Yeary, the Sixth Circuit stated
61. See Sardinia, 1995 WL 640502 at *5.
62. See id.
63. See id. at *6.
64. Id.
65. See Yeary, 107 F.3d at 448; see also Pritchett v. Sizeler, Civ.A.No. 93-2511, 1995
WL 241855 (E.D. La. 1995). In a context where the harasser was a homosexual male
harassing a heterosexual male, the court held that "[s]ame gender harassment is clearly a
form of gender discrimination because 'but for' the gender of the subordinate, [he] would
not have been subjected to the harassment." Id. at *2. It should be noted, however, that the
court was most concerned in Pritchett with not permitting homosexual supervisors to harass
their subordinates with impunity rather than assuring that regardless of the sexual
orientation of the harasser that individuals are protected from sexual harassment. See id.
For instance, if the harasser is heterosexual and is creating a sexually hostile environment
for a homosexual employee of the same sex, because of his or her sex, it is unclear whether
the Pritchett court would likewise find this harassment actionable under Title VII.
See also Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F. Supp. 1133 (C.D. 111. 1995). The
Griffith court allowed the same-sex cause of action by relying on indications in the Seventh
Circuit by Judge Posner that such harassment would likely be actionable in the circuit and
the statutory language, which contains no limiting language that would preclude a cause of
action for employees harassed by members of the same sex. See id. at 1136. In addition,
the court rejected the Goluszek requirement that the victim be employed in an environment
that is hostile to his or her gender generally to have a claim under Title VII. The court held
that the same-sex hostile environment harassment was actionable. "Griffith has alleged that
he was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment because of his sex that was not directed
to female employees, [therefore] he states a claim under Title VII." Id. at 1137. See also
Wright v. Methodist Youth Services Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307, 310 (N.D. Il. 1981) (finding
that regardless of the gender of the harasser or the harassed, "the legal problem would be
identical... the exaction of a condition which, but for his or her sex, the employee would
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that
[t]he only question here is whether a complaint can potentially
state a Title VII claim when both the harasser and harassed are of
the same sex... There is no question that Yeary has sufficiently
alleged that he was harassed "because of' his sex... He had to
put up with abuse and harassment that women there did not have
to endure.66
Therefore, at least in a context where the employee is sexually
propositioned by a supervisor of the same-sex, the Sixth Circuit has found
such conduct actionable through application of the "but for" test.
Thus, although the reasoning of courts which have held that same-sex
hostile environment is actionable is disparate, certain common themes are
apparent. First, courts that uphold a cause of action under Title VII reject
the anti-male or anti-female environment requirement that was articulated
by the Goluszek court. Furthermore, the plain language of Title VII, which
contains no express preclusion, is held to lay the basis for a same-sex
hostile environment harassment claim. Finally, courts have relied on the
"because of sex" language of Title VII and have found that, in the case of
same-sex hostile environment harassment, this type of harassment must be
demonstrated to be "because of sex" to the same extent that heterosexual
hostile environment harassment must be so demonstrated. However, the
"because of sex" requirement does not alone preclude allowing such a
cause of action to proceed under Title VII and may instead cause the
plaintiff to be subjected to a more stringent standard of proof than in the
case of heterosexual, opposite sex hostile environment harassment.
III. INCONSISTENCIES WITHIN THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT FRAMEWORK
Although it is questionable whether Title VII when enacted
contemplated a cause of action for hostile environment sexual harassment
at all, once having extended the statute's coverage to provide for such a
cause of action, the statute should be applied consistently to all the various
permutations of sexual harassment. As the law now stands, there exist
numerous inconsistencies within the sexual harassment framework,
including extending Title VII's coverage to protect males in the workplace,
which belie many of the arguments currently pressed to justify the
inconsistent result of not allowing a cause of action for same-sex sexual
harassment under Title VII. Furthermore, as evidenced by the treatment of
the bisexual harasser, the disparate treatment of same-sex hostile
environment cases is merely symptomatic of an overarching problem in
not have faced.") (citation omitted).
66. Yeary, 107 F.3d at 448.
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sexual harassment law that appears to rely on artificial demarcation points
for allowing remedies under the statute, rather than fundamental
consistencies that would flow naturally from the underlying purpose of
Title VII, which is undeniably to remove hostility based on immutable
characteristics like race and sex from the workplace.
A. The Straightforward Application of the Meritor Framework in Male
on Female Sexual Harassment
In the context of harassment perpetrated by a male harasser against a
female victim, the application of the analytic framework established in
Meritor has been straightforward. 7  Courts require that the alleged
harassment has the purpose or effect of creating a hostile work
environment and that the harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter the conditions of employment.6 These requirements are evaluated
from the totality of the circumstances and from the standpoint of the
reasonable person.69
Notably absent from the cases concerning harassment by a male
perpetrator against a female victim are the additional requirements (e.g., an
anti-female environment) that have been articulated in the same-sex hostile
environment case law. In fact, at least one court has held that where it is
clear that the victim would not have been harassed "but for" her sex, the
content of the harassment need not be sexual in nature.70
Intimidation and hostility toward women because they are
women can obviously result from conduct other than explicit
sexual advances. Title VII "evinces a Congressional intention to
define discrimination in the broadest possible terms. Congress
chose neither to enumerate specific discriminatory practices, nor
to elucidate in extenso the parameter of such nefarious
activities."'"
At least one other court, by contrast, has held that even if the
motivation for harassment is gender neutral, if the manner in which the
harassment is carried out is gender specific, a Title VII claim will exist.72
"[P]laintiff' s coworkers often chose sexually harassing behavior to express
their dislike of plaintiff, conduct which would not have occurred if she
67. See, e.g., Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295 (2d Cir. 1995); Beardsley v. Webb,
30 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 1994).
68. See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1304.
69. See id.
70. See Hall v. Gus Const. Co., 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988).
71. Id. at 1014.
72. See Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge, Inc., 79 F.3d 996, 1000 (10th Cir. 1996).
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were not a woman."73
Therefore, in the context of heterosexual opposite sex harassment,
courts have not had difficulty discerning when an actionable Title VII
claim has been articulated solely through reliance on the test articulated by
the Supreme Court. Further, some courts have even gone so far as to relax
the implicit requirements of Meritor and fail to require even that the sexual
harassment have sexual content or when the content is sexual that it be
motivated by the female victim's sex alone.
B. Extension of Title VII to Protect Men Harassed by Women
The protections of Title VII have been extended to protect men from
harassment by female supervisors in the workplace. This evolution of
Title VII jurisprudence undercuts the argument made, in particular by the
Goluszek court, that the purpose of Title VII was to protect those with
minority status in the workplace.
In the area of quid pro quo sexual harassment, it is clear that Title VII
protects male employees to an equal extent as it protects female employees
from such behavior.74 Further, it is implicit in the language used in
decisions finding hostile environment harassment where the victim is
female, that hostile environment harassment is actionable under Title VII
when the victim is male.75  "To maintain an action under Title VII, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she has experienced [harassment]." 76
This is consistent with the handling of causation in racial discrimination
cases, where the victim is a majority group member. In these cases, the
Supreme Court has unequivocally held that the protections of Title VII
were intended to run to all individuals, whether or not they are members of
a racial minority group.77
73. Id.
74. See Showalter v. Allison Reed Group, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1205, 1211 (D.R.I. 1991)
("[B]oth plaintiffs are members of a 'protected group.' Title VII protects both males and
females from sexual harassment.") (citation omitted). Showalter involved an instance of
quid pro quo sexual harassment where the employer was male but forced his male
employees to engage in sex with his secretary in return for retaining their jobs. See id. See
also Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682 (1983)
("Male as well as female employees are protected against discrimination.") (explaining
protection under Title VI).
75. See, e.g., Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 418 (7th Cir. 1989).
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-79 (1976) ("[Title
VII's] terms are not limited to discrimination against members of any particular race. [T]he
Act... prohibit[s] 'discriminatory preference for any racial group, minority or majority."')
(emphasis in original) (citations and brackets omitted). Furthermore, the Court indicated
that this determination is fully consistent with legislative history of Title VII, which makes
clear that the Act was intended to "cover white men and white women and all Americans."
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Therefore, the holding of Goluszek, which required that an individual
who has a cause of action under Title VII for hostile environment
harassment must be employed in an environment that is hostile to the
victim's gender as a whole, is completely inconsistent with the plain
language of Supreme Court precedent. Furthermore, if this were a
requirement of Title VII law, "a similar argument could be made when a
white plaintiff attempts to sue for reverse discrimination under Title VII.
That white plaintiff would have been at all times a member of the
'dominant race'."" This result would obviously conflict with well settled
Supreme Court doctrine. Just as a white plaintiff has a cause of action
under Title VII when he or she is faced with racial discrimination, the male
employee has a cause of action, as does a female employee, when faced
with sexual harassment.
Not only is the additional requirement of Goluszek of an anti-male or
anti-female environment nonexistent in other areas of Title VII case law,
the requirement actually directly conflicts with the established rule of law
that Title VII's protections are not limited to those individuals who are
members of particular groups. Rather, it is an individual cause of action
triggered when an individual employee is faced with conduct which
violates his or her Title VII rights and not those of his or her race or gender
as a whole.
C. Inconsistency of Disallowing a Cause of Action Where the Harasser
is Bisexual
Another area of inconsistency within the sexual harassment
framework is evident in the treatment of harassment that is perpetrated by
an oppressor who is bisexual. At least one court has indicated that it may
not provide for a cause of action where the perpetrator of the harassment is
bisexual and, therefore, likely to impose similar harassment on members of
both sexes.7 Other courts, however, have stated that the fact that an
oppressor is an equal opportunity harasser will not cure behavior that
would otherwise be violative of Title VII. °
Id. at 280 (citations omitted).
78. See Prescott, 878 F. Supp. at 1550.
79. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("In the case of a
bisexual supervisor, the insistence upon sexual favors would not constitute gender
discrimination because it would apply to male and female employees alike.") It should be
noted, however, that this statement was dicta in a footnote and therefore cannot be fully
relied upon as predictable authority for how this court would rule if faced with the actual
issue.
80. See Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1082 (1995) ("[Eiven if [the defendant] used sexual epithets equal in
intensity and in an equally degrading manner against male employees, he cannot thereby
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The existence of a cause of action turning on whether or not the
oppressor is bisexual will cause difficult issues of proof for both parties. It
is unclear, from the limited indications of how these cases will be resolved,
what standard of evidence will be required for a plaintiff to prove that his
or her harasser is not in fact bisexual. For instance, one court could
require that the harasser identify himself or herself as bisexual without
requiring sexual orientation to be proven through extrinsic evidence. This
is obviously problematic because it would provide an incentive on the part
of the harasser to declare him or herself bisexual to avoid a violation of
Title VII.
However, it is clear that the treatment of the bisexual harasser, like
the treatment of same-sex hostile environment harassment, is yet another
area of Title VII law that must be resolved consistent with the plain
language of the act and previous Supreme Court interpretation. It would
appear that the "because of sex" language of Title VII would equally be
satisfied in the case of the bisexual harasser." A bisexual individual who
sexually harasses either or both genders does so "because of' the sex of the
victim, regardless of the victim's gender. Therefore, there is no
justification for the sexual orientation of the harasser to immediately
exempt the behavior from the purview of Title VII.
IV. INCONSISTENCIES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE VII AS
COMPARED TO RACIAL OR RELIGIOUS HARASSMENT
Sexual harassment cases are resolved inconsistently turning either on
the sex of the harasser and the harassed, on whether the environment as a
whole is hostile to the victim's gender or on the sexual orientation of the
oppressor. These anomalies are yet more evident when compared with the
more consistent treatment of the variations of racial and religious
harassment under Title VII.
'cure' his conduct toward women."). See also Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F.
Supp. 1334 (D. Wy. 1993). The court noted that it is highly unlikely that Congress
intended to protect an individual from harassment that is directed at an employee by a
homosexual supervisor and not that directed at him or her by a bisexual supervisor. See id.
at 1336-37 (quoting Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1333 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J.,
dissenting)). If this were the case, then it would appear that all that Congress sought to
remedy by Title VII was discrimination because of gender, and not sexual harassment.
Therefore, the court pointed out, once the decision has been made to extend the protections
of Title VII to instances of harassment, and not solely discrimination, this decision requires
a reconfiguration of the Title VII harassment doctrine to include a cause of action for
harassment by a bisexual supervisor on equal terms as harassment by a homosexual or
heterosexual supervisor. See id.
81. See Chiapuzio, 826 F. Supp. at 1337 ("Where a harasser violates both men and
women, 'it is not unthinkable to argue that each individual who is harassed is being treated
badly because of gender."') (citation omitted).
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A. Religious Harassment
The requirements for a cause of action for hostile environment religious
harassment continue to be the same basic requirements that exist for a
cause of action for sexual harassment under Title VII as outlined by the
Supreme Court in Meritor.8 Victims who seek to state a claim under Title
VII for religious hostile environment discrimination must, as must those
seeking to state a claim for sexual harassment, establish that the
harassment was "because of' their religion." The central limitation for
successful articulation of a cause of action under Title VII for religious
harassment, however, appears to be the severity of the religious
harassment, rather than turning on whether or not the harassment occurred
"because of' the victim's religion. 4
82.See Sarin v. Raytheon Co., 905 F. Supp. 49, 52 (D. Mass. 1995):
[Plaintiff] must make a showing that 1) unwelcome comments, jokes, acts, and
other verbal or physical conduct of an ethnic and/or religious nature were made
in the workplace; 2) such conduct had the effect of creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment or unreasonably interfered with an
individual's work performance; and 3) the employer knew or should have
known of the conduct.
See also Turner v. Barr, 806 F. Supp. 1025 (D.D.C. 1992). The court indicated that "an
employer violates Title VII "simply by creating or condoning an environment at the
workplace which significantly and adversely affects (the psychological well-being) of an
employee because of his race or ethnicity."' Id. at 1027 (citation omitted). The comments
on which the cause of action was based included references to the plaintiff's race and
religion. See id. at 1027-28. The court, under a "totality of the circumstances" analysis,
held that the plaintiff was subject to the abuse because of his religion and race. See id. at
1029. However, the court made no specific finding regarding whether the plaintiff would
have likewise been harassed if he had been of a different race. Instead, the court appeared
to be focusing on the racial and religious content of the abuse to determine that the
harassment was because of plaintiff's religion and race as required by Title VII. See id. at
1028-29.
83. See, e.g., Goldberg v. City of Philadelphia, No. CIV. A. 91-7575, 1994 WL
313030, at *10 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 1994). The court listed the five elements that a plaintiff
must demonstrate to establish a hostile environment religious harassment claim. The first
element is that the victim was harassed because of his religion. The second and third
elements are that the harassment was pervasive and that it detrimentally affected the
plaintiff. The fourth is that the conduct would detrimentally affect a reasonable person of
the same religion and the fifth requirement is the existence of respondeat superior liability.
See id.
84. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Holiday Inns, Inc., No. 89 C 7458, 1990 WL 44472, at *9
(N.D. 111. Apr. 6, 1990). The court stated that racial slurs may not be sufficient to state a
claim for religious harassment under Title VII. See id. at *6. Rather, the plaintiff must still
demonstrate that the conduct was sufficiently severe to alter the conditions of employment.
See id. at *9. In Shapiro, the victim was unsuccessful in pursuing a cause of action under
Title VII because, although apparently assumed by the court to be harassed "because of' her
religion, the conduct was not severe enough according to the court to alter the conditions of
the plaintiffs employment. See id.
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The treatment of religious hostile environment claims has been
relatively straightforward, requiring neither a showing of an anti-religious
atmosphere nor an explicit showing that "but for" the victim's religion the
oppressor would not have harassed the victim. The implication of this
disparity is that in the religious context, where religious slurs are often
used as the vehicle of harassment, there is a prima facie showing of
religious animus." Therefore, the Title VII requirement that religious
harassment be because of the victim's religion is implicitly satisfied by the
form of the abusive language itself. While this is, perhaps, an
unproblematic assumption, it should be equally unproblematic to hold that,
when slurs of a sexual nature are aimed at an employee, those slurs are
prima facie evidence that he or she is harassed "because of' his or her sex,
whether or not the underlying motive for the harassment was focused on
the sex of the victim.
In the case of religious harassment, no inquiry is made into whether
or not the harassment was specifically motivated by the particular religious
faith of the individual. Furthermore, such an inquiry into the actual
motivations would be and is very difficult to undertake. While it would
prove difficult for a court to discern actual motives, it would nevertheless
be straightforward to look to the plain content of the harassment to discern
whether or not it is because of sex or because of religion. However, it is
apparent that should courts desire to place the additional limitation on
religious harassment claims that has been placed on sexual harassment
actions, plaintiffs would be faced with the same difficulties in stating a
cause of action as those faced in the same-sex sexual harassment context.
For example, if an employer was shown to harass all employees of
various different religions, courts could claim, as they have in the same-
sex harassment context, that such harassment was then not because of the
victim's religion, but rather is motivated by general hostility. However,
this course of action has not been pursued by courts and, therefore, victims
of religious harassment are not confronted with the difficulty of
establishing that their harasser targeted them because of their religion as
are plaintiffs who seek to sue an employer for same-sex sexual harassment
under Title VII.
85. See, e.g., Weiss v. United States, 595 F. Supp. 1050, 1056 (E.D. Va. 1984). The
court indicated that the plaintiff can make out a cause of action under Title VII for hostile
environment harassment by demonstrating "[c]ontinuous abusive language, whether racist,
sexist, or religious in form." Id. at 1056.
86. See, e.g., Rosen v. Baker, No. CV-88-1969, 1995 WL 264169, at *7 (E.D.N.Y.
May 1, 1995) ("The cases discussing hostile work environments due to religious animus
have consistently been in the context of spoken derogatory remarks or coerced religious
activity.") The court went on to hold that having a Bible in one's office did not rise to the
level of severity required to state a cause of action under Title VII for religious harassment.
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B. Racial Harassment
Racial harassment cases, like religious harassment cases under Title
VII, have not had the tortuous history of sexual harassment cases. Rather,
the test remains the straightforward test announced by the court in Meritor
and district courts have not made efforts, as they have in the sexual
harassment context, to further refine the inquiry.' Some courts, however,
have indicated that the racial harassment must be severe and pervasive"
and must stem from racial animus or must be racial in content.89 The
evaluation is to be undertaken from a totality of the circumstances
perspective." The court in Aman emphasized that there was no
requirement that the statements creating the racially hostile working
environment be explicitly racial. Rather, it is only necessary that the
statements made by the alleged harasser reveal, implicitly, racial hostility
for those statements to create a hostile environment. "There are no
talismanic expressions which must be invoked as a condition-precedent to
the application of laws designed to protect against discrimination. The
words themselves are only relevant for what they reveal-the intent of the
speaker."9' The court, however, did indicate that it is relevant in a racial
harassment claim that there be evidence that the individual would not have
been treated the same had he or she been white.' However, the court did
not rest its finding of a racially hostile environment on a showing of this
disparity.
Therefore, in the context of racial harassment, the standard for a
victim to demonstrate that harassment is "because of' his or her race
seems to be even less demanding than the requirement in the religious
context which in turn is more easily satisfied then the sexual harassment
87. See Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 461 (4th Cir. 1994)("A racially hostile working
environment must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment
and create an abusive atmosphere."). Further, the court stated that the statements on which
the hostile environment claim are predicated cannot be trivial or isolated incidents and the
employer must have actual or constructive notice of the offensive conduct. See id.; see also
White v. Federal Express Corp., 939 F.2d 157, 160 (4th Cir. 1991).
88. See Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1080-81 (3d Cir. 1996).
89. See Bolden v. PRC Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 550-51 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116
S.Ct. 92 (1995). The court indicated that to support a claim for a racially hostile work
environment the plaintiff must demonstrate that the harassment was severe and pervasive
enough to alter the terms and conditions of employment and that "the harassment was racial
or stemmed from racial animus." Id. at 550. But see Lee v. Junior College Dist., No.
4:94CV415 CDP, 1995 WL 363723, (E.D. Mo. Mar. 8, 1995), aff'd, 91 F.3d 148 (8th Cir.
1996)(holding that conduct that involved questioning a black employee about specifically
racial issues did not constitute behavior that reflected racial hostility).
90. See West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744,753 (3d Cir. 1995).
91. Aman, 85 F.3d at 1083'.
92. See id.
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context. In the racial context, not only will racist statements be de facto
evidence that harassment is because of an individual's race, but statements
that are arguably racial only by implication may be inferred to be because
of race.
This result is obviously correct in the context of racial harassment.
However, there is no justification for not applying the same sensitive
inquiry to the context of same-sex sexual harassment. In the context of
sexual harassment, arguably sex-neutral comments will not be imputed to
a gender-specific hostility. Rather, first the comments must be explicitly
sexual and even then, in the context of same-sex sexual harassment, the
victim may still fail to state a claim under Title VII because the statements
are held not to be motivated "because of' the victim's sex. The
implication is that when the content is racist, the harassment is
automatically because of one's race. This is of course a correct result;
however, it should be contrasted to the sexual harassment context which
does not allow a mere showing of sexual content to be proof that the
harassment is because of sex.
Furthermore, in the racial discrimination context the defense that the
individual who was responsible for the discrimination was found to be of
the same race as the individual discriminated against has been found to be
untenable.93 In fact, the contention that the harasser being of the same race
as the defendant should provide a defense for discrimination charges has
been dismissed out of hand by at least one court, reasoning that it is the
employer as a whole who is charged with racial discrimination, a violation
of Title VII, and not the specific supervisor.94 Although, occurring in a
slightly different context than hostile environment harassment, these cases
93. See United States v. Crosby, 59 F.3d 1133, 1135 n.4 (lth Cir. 1995) ("[The
defendant] is black.... we acknowledge that a Title VII violation may occur even where a
supervisor or decision-maker is of the same race as the alleged victim.") The court,
however, did go further to reject the government's contention that the defendant in this
particular instance treated members of his own race any differently than all other
employees. Id.
94. See Billingsley v. Jefferson County, 953 F.2d 1351 (11th Cir. 1992). The court
found that the defendants contention that the presence of a black man in a supervisory
position did not impute the defendant with the supervisor's race and thereby make it
impossible that they be charged with racial discrimination against a black employee. Id.
"The presence of a black man in a supervisory or decision-making position in Jefferson
County cannot shield the county from liability under Title VII." Id. at 1353. See also In re
Lewis, 845 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1988). Although discussing the state law claim and not the
Title VII claim by the plaintiff, the Lewis court aptly summarized the incongruity of
denying a discrimination action where the oppressor is of the same race as the victim,
indicating the incredibility of the defendant's contention by questioning whether the
"defendant mean[t] to imply that, because blacks, women, or older persons are involved in
the decision-making structure of a company, then race, sex or age discrimination cannot
occur?" Id. at 634.
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indicate persuasive authority for the proposition that should cases arise
where the victim claims that he or she has been subject to hostile
environment racial harassment, the victim will not be denied a cause of
action under Title VII solely because his or her harasser is of the same
race.
This result should be contrasted with the hostile environment context
where the mere fact that the harasser is heterosexual and of the same
gender as the victim often will result in the victim being denied a cause of
action under Title VII. Further, even in circuits where a cause of action is
permitted for same-sex hostile environment harassment, the victim is held
to a higher standard when he or she is subjected to harassment by an
individual who is of their same gender than he or she would be if the
individual were of the opposite gender. This inconsistency causes the
ability of the victim to seek reprisal for unsolicited harassment to turn on
what gender has chosen to inflict the damage--chosen them to be their
victim. In contrast, criteria such as the severity of the conduct are
generally employed in other contexts to limit the availability of Title VII
remedies to particularly egregious forms of harassment.
VI. A NEW APPROACH: A CALL FOR CONSISTENCY
It is evident from an evaluation of the inconsistent treatment of
hostile environment sexual harassment, which now turns on the gender of
the victim and harasser as well as on their sexual orientation, that the
current framework for such actions under Title VII is unworkable. These
analytic frameworks are not only logically inconsistent-they are also
jurisprudentially irreconcilable. Furthermore, the inconsistent treatment of
sexual harassment claims cannot be reconciled with the treatment of racial
and religious harassment cases from which the cause of action for sexual
harassment originally evolved. A new approach that would result in a
consistent and internally and externally logical application of hostile
environment sexual harassment claims must be implemented.
One feasible option would be simply to utilize the requirements
outlined by the Supreme Court in Meritor, including their inherent
limitations that the behavior must be severe and pervasive and viewed as
abusive from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's
situation. The requirement that the harassment be "because of' the
individual's sex would undoubtedly be satisfied, even in the heterosexual
same-sex harassment context, if the test employed in racial or religious
harassment cases was applied. For example, if the content of the harassing
speech is sexual, there should be the rebuttable presumption that the
speech is directed at the gender of the victim. This is consistent with the
treatment of racial slurs in the racial harassment context although the
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presumption is not rebuttable in that context. In the sexual harassment
context, because there are instances where reference to sexual topics is
socially and legally acceptable even in the workplace, the presumption that
the speech directly addresses the victim's gender should be rebuttable by
the defendant.
The "but for" test adopted by some courts could also be retained if the
test were refined so that it would yield consistent results across the various
types of sexual harassment cases. For example, the question asked by a
court could be, "but for the victim's gender would the harasser have
engaged in factually-specific conduct X?" In all but very limited contexts,
this approach would not lead to the confusion that now exists in the area of
hostile environment law. Even in the case of the bisexual harasser, it is
highly unlikely that harassing behavior directed at men would be identical
to the harassing behavior directed at women. If solely because of social
construction or biology, abusive sexual comments made toward women
will necessarily be distinct from those that would be directed at men.
Further, in the rare case where the harassment is identical, rather than
immediately excepting the conduct from the statute's protections, the court
could allow the defendant to utilize the equality of his harassment as an
affirmative defense. Such a defense would be that the behavior was not
related to the victim's gender or sex and, therefore, is outside the scope of
Title VII.
Finally, any requirement that the individual victim of sexual
harassment must be employed in an environment that is hostile to his or
her entire gender to state a cause of action under Title VII should be
wholly discarded, as well as should most of the current case law which
relies on such a perspective to deny the victim of same-sex harassment a
cause of action under Title VII. Not only is such a requirement
inconsistent with sexual harassment law and other areas of Title VII
jurisprudence, it patently conflicts with the entire spirit of a statute
designed to protect the individual. Such a requirement leads to the
incongruous result that, for an individual to be protected by the civil rights
statute, he or she must work in an environment that has abused his or her
entire gender before the statute, which speaks to individual protections,
will be triggered.
Ultimately, however, the area of hostile environment harassment law
must be revaluated and reconfigured so that it is realigned to protect those
interests it was written to address, discrimination based on immutable
characteristics in the workplace. If the law remains as it now stands, it will
only achieve equality for harassers whose conduct fits into cramped and
artificial categories and will not reach those who continue to abuse, but
now choose their words or the sex of their victim more carefully.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Assuming the debatable conclusion that it was a wise decision to
establish hostile environment sexual harassment from the narrow wording
of Title VII and the dearth of legislative history, the doctrine must now be
applied consistently regardless of the various heterosexual and homosexual
permutations in which this objectionable behavior manifests itself.
Courts have, however, held fast to the notion that hostile environment
harassment is not about ridding the workplace of hostile, degrading
behaviors that focus on the sexuality of the individual harassed. Rather,
courts often seem to suggest that the doctrine seeks only to rid the
workplace of behaviors, whether offensive or not, that are inconsistent
across genders. The result of this underlying perspective has been a
doctrine for hostile environment harassment that is both inconsistent and
illogical. Regardless of what the origins of the doctrine were, the doctrine
has clearly evolved. If, for example, the original purpose was to make
women equal participants in the workplace, that is obviously no longer
solely what the doctrine seeks to address, since it has been consistently
extended to men who are harassed by their superiors.
Further, arguments that the doctrine is designed to remedy
environments that are anti-male or anti-female are also inconsistent with
the doctrine's application which, except in the area of same-sex
harassment law, does not require that the environment as a whole be
categorizable as such. Furthermore, whether or not the evolution of the
application of the doctrine to males being harassed by females has been
correct, once that further step has been taken the doctrine should be
applied consistently regardless of the gender or sexual orientation of the
harasser.
Instead, when examining whether it is sufficient to have created a
"hostile environment," the focus of the doctrine should be on the sexual
content and extremity of the harassment. The doctrine, as it now stands, is
not only internally inconsistent with regard to its application within the
sexual harassment context, but is also inconsistent when compared to the
treatment of religious and racial harassment from which the sexual
harassment doctrine evolved. In those contexts, the doctrine has been
applied straightforwardly and consistently. This lends further support to
the argument that the inconsistencies in the sexual harassment context
have evolved from the unwillingness of courts to accept that underlying
the doctrine is the desire to rid the workplace of conduct which is abusive
and sexual in nature and thereby offensive, whoever engages in the
conduct and to whomever it is directed, male or female, heterosexual or
homosexual.
In certain circuits, as the doctrine now stands, it is impossible for
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someone who is bisexual to harass either men or women because of the
application of the "but for" test. This result is completely illogical and
sends the frightening message that as long as you create a sexually
degrading hostile environment which renders all individuals, male and
female, unable to work, there can be no cause of action. It is
incomprehensible how this result could possibly perpetuate the intentions
of Congress in enacting Title VII. In contrast, should an employer hurl
racial epithets at all individuals with whom he works, this behavior would
not somehow be cured of its racially offensive content or Title VII
violative nature because the employer was an equal opportunity racial
harasser. In the context of racial harassment the question is simple: was
this racially offensive conduct directed at someone who as a consequence
of their race felt harassed? The question should be just as simple in the
sexual harassment context.
The suggestion of this comment is that the Title VII doctrine should
be reconfigured in two fundamental ways. First, courts should accept that
the common, fundamental theme of all hostile environment cases, whether
sexual, religious, or racial, is that the workplace should be devoid of
hostile, abusive, and degrading conduct directed at individuals because of
personal, private factors which touch on categories of attributes that this
country has deemed irrelevant and inappropriate in the workplace, among
them race, sexuality, and religion. Second, the already established sexual
harassment doctrine should be applied to every scenario. The artificial
distinctions between who can and who cannot maintain a cause of action,
which appear to be based on stereotypical notions of what is and is not
acceptable for heterosexual and homosexual males and females, should be
wholly discarded.
There will remain inherent limits on liability that have always been
present to prevent excessive Title VII litigation and the consequential
unreasonably sensitive work environments. The conduct must still be
pervasive and offensive such that a reasonable person in the plaintiff's
situation would find the work environment abusive and hostile. All that
needs to be done is to infuse the reasonable person with the characteristics
of the particular defendant's sexual orientation and gender to effectuate the
natural limitations of this approach. Otherwise, the doctrine will continue
to be devoid of any consistency and logic and may result in a woman being
informed that she has not been sexually harassed after being subjected to
repeated misogynistic comments, grabbed on occasion, and faced with
lewd remarks by her entire office, because those who are employed are all
bisexual and would have abused a man as well.
There is clearly a fear on the part of courts that extending the sexual
harassment doctrine in this way will lay the groundwork for endless
litigation. However, the limitations of the doctrine, which have previously
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prevented excessive litigation, remain and behavior that is merely
offensive remains, for better or worse, inactionable under Title VII.
However, an alternative approach that would provide for a cause of action
universally for the victims of harassment that has a sexual content and
which rises to the level of an abusive environment, can assure victims that
they will have an internally and externally consistent body of law with
which to seek redress.
